A. ３ページから始まる英文は，Manvir Singhによる "Talk Sense" (2025) に基づいている。これを読んで以下の設問に答えなさい。

1. 空欄（１）に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び，記号で答えなさい。

   （A）conflicting　（B）disparate　（C）similar　（D）synonymous

2. 空欄（２）に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び，記号で答えなさい。

   （ア）arbiter　　（イ）genesis　　（ウ）means　　（エ）recipient

3. 下線部（３）はどのような考え方か。本文の議論をふまえて100字以上120字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

4. 下線部（４）を日本語に訳しなさい。

5. 下線部（５）を日本語に訳しなさい。

6. 空欄（６）に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び，記号で答えなさい。

   （a）investigate　（b）multiply　（c）reify　（d）transform

7. 下線部（７）を，本文中で英語と比較されている言語の２つ以上の具体例をふまえて，60字以上75字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

B. Respond in English to the following question:

What is the most important realization that you have made about other cultures by studying foreign languages?

You are not required to use Singh's text in your response though you may do so. Your response will be evaluated on clarity of content as well as vocabulary and grammatical ability. Do not exceed the space provided for this question on the answer sheet.

Everyone can agree that language affects thought. If I told you that I have a pet badger and twenty-two canaries, you'd have new thoughts about my home life. The real question is whether a language itself has features that affect how its speakers think: Does conversing in Spanish for a month make objects seem more gendered? Does speaking English rather than Hindi make you less casteist, and maybe more capitalist?

Today, questions like these tend to be associated with Benjamin Lee Whorf, a fire-insurance analyst who studied linguistics at Yale in the nineteen-thirties. History has been both kind and unkind to him. On the one hand, his name has become ⃞ (1) ⃞ with a theory about how language affects thought, though it predated him by at least a century. On the other hand, the version of the theory often attributed to him is so radical that few modern scholars would want the honor, anyway.

Whorf laid out his views in an essay titled "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language." Contrasting the way time is discussed by English speakers (as an object that can be quantified and divided) and by Hopi speakers (as a more continuous process, or so Whorf believed), he suggested that linguistic differences contributed to differences in how each group understands temporal flow. Despite the boldness of his claims, he was also cautious, proposing merely "traceable affinities" between language and behavior, nothing ironclad, and stressing that he was "the last to pretend that there is anything so definite as 'a correlation.' "

Unfortunately, that nuance has usually been forgotten. Whorf has since become the mascot of linguistic determinism—the position that language is the ultimate ⃞ (2) ⃞ of thought. Whorfianism, as it's sometimes called, quickly dissolves into absurdities: if your language lacks a proper future tense, tomorrow will be inconceivable; if your language lacks certain emotion words, you will never feel them. Preverbal infants, orangutans, and all other creatures incapable of language are, by implication, powerless to perform many basic mental operations.

Whorfianism has been the target of relentless discrediting. The Harvard cognitive scientist Steven Pinker has had much to say about Whorfian fallacies. He has shown how common experiences—like searching for the right word or inventing a new term for an existing intuition—invalidate the idea that language always precedes thought. Writing in *The Language Instinct* (1994), he concludes that Whorfianism is "wrong, all wrong."

That's a fair assessment if we're talking about the strongest interpretation of Whorf's arguments. Yet the picture emerging from the latest research is more complicated. Whorfianism is wrong—but it isn't *all* wrong.

"Each of my languages comes not only with its own patterns of sound

and methods for arranging words but also with its social habits and its judgments about what to forgive, what to condemn, and what to revere," Julie Sedivy writes in *Linguaphile: A Life of Language Love* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux). Born in what was then Czechoslovakia, Sedivy grew up in a "linguistic bedlam," hopping between Austria and Italy before settling down in Montreal. She was acquainted with five languages by kindergarten and went on to study how people learn and process language. Science suffuses her book, yet, as a way of knowing, it coexists with experience; the resulting volume isn't so much a standard pop-sci book as it is a rhapsodic meditation on loving, taming, and forgetting words. She senses that distinct cognitive styles are tied to the different languages she speaks, comparing them to personalities bickering for the spotlight. "I am a cacophony of voices, influencing each other, at times assisting each other, at times getting in each other's way, always vying for turf," she writes.

Testimony from polyglots like her has invited a more sophisticated take on Whorf's ideas. What if language is less like a yoke than like a wind, nudging us in various directions? This moderate approach, which is more in line with Whorf's original perspective, is known as "weak Whorfianism" or, paradoxically, (3)neo-Whorfianism.

Some neo-Whorfian studies have already become classics. One led by the psychologist Jonathan Winawer and published in 2007 took advantage of the fact that, where English has the word "blue," Russian has two basic color terms: *goluboy* (lighter blue) and *siniy* (darker blue). Russian speakers in the experiment proved faster than English speakers at distinguishing shades that corresponded to that lexical distinction.

Other such studies exploit variations in, for instance, how languages talk about temporal duration (long and short, as in English, or big and small, as in Greek) or the ordering of events (B following A, as in English, or B below A, as in Mandarin), testing whether those differences correlate with performance on experimental tasks. Many linguists remain unimpressed. In the anti-Whorfian polemic *The Language Hoax* (2014), John H. McWhorter, of Columbia University, describes this research as mostly showing "*eensy-weensy differences" of the sort that "one might find in the cosseted context of a psychological experiment."

Caleb Everett, an anthropologist and psychologist at the University of Miami, arrives at another conclusion in *A Myriad of Tongues* (Harvard). Everett's book is about the surprising ways that languages differ and about the significance these differences may have. He starts by covering Whorf's favorite topic: time. English speakers instinctively split time into categories of past, present, and future, but many others don't. Karitiâna, an Amazonian

language Everett studied two decades ago, has two tenses, future and non-future, while another Amazonian language, Yagua, seems to have eight, including for events that occurred between a month and a year ago, for events that are about to happen, and for events expected to happen further into the future.

More relevant for Whorfianism are the metaphors people use to organize time. For English speakers, time is understood spatially, with the past typically "behind us" and the future "ahead." Aymara, an Andean language spoken by millions of Indigenous Bolivians and Peruvians, likewise uses space to talk about time but favors a metaphor about sight. In Aymara, *nayra*, or last year, translates literally to something like "the year I can see." The past, visible, thus stands in front of the speaker, while the future, unseeable, looms behind. *Ancha nayra pachana*, or a long time ago, can roughly be translated as "a time way in front of me." When researchers analyzed videos of people chatting, they noticed that the metaphors inform gesture, with fluent Aymara speakers pointing backward to talk about the future and forward to talk about the past. Spanish speakers from the same region show the opposite patterns, suggesting that language configures how speakers map time onto space.

Some cognitive scientists have assumed that all humans, whatever their local quirks, reason about time using spatial metaphors, yet at least one language, Tupi-Kawahíb, evidently lacks any mapping between time and space—not left to right, back to front, or downhill to uphill. When Tupi-Kawahíb speakers were asked to organize objects to chart out the seasons of a year, researchers struggled to understand the arrangements the speakers had created. (4)More than communication tools, languages help concretize the abstract, providing frameworks for making sense of concepts as fundamental as time.

Of the many topics Everett covers—which include space, number, and object categorization—the most fascinating is probably sensory vocabulary. Western writers have long assumed that human beings have an inherently limited capacity to describe some senses, with olfaction ranking as the most elusive. We can speak abstractly about colors (red, blue, black) and sound (high, low, loud). With smell, though, we usually give "source-based" references ("like cut grass"). But the cognitive scientist Asifa Majid, now of Oxford, and the linguist Niclas Burenhult, of Lund University, in Sweden, have shown that this needn't be the case. They discovered that the Jahai, hunter-gatherers living at the border of Malaysia and Thailand, have a rich vocabulary of abstract smell words. One Jahai term, *itpit*, refers to the "intense smell of durian, perfume, soap, *Aquillaria* wood, and *bearcat*,"

Majid and Burenhult report. Another, *cnes*, applies to "the smell of petrol, smoke, bat droppings and bat caves, some species of millipede, root of wild ginger, leaf of gingerwort, wood of mango tree." Subsequent research has found large olfactory lexicons in at least forty other languages, among them Fang, Khmer, Swahili, and Zapotec.

It makes a difference. In a study that Majid and Burenhult conducted a decade ago, Jahai and English speakers were asked to identify and name twelve smells, including cinnamon, turpentine, gasoline, and onion. English speakers, despite their greater familiarity with the odors, faltered. They mostly gave rambling source-based answers and showed almost no agreement among themselves. One English speaker presented with cinnamon responded, "I don't know how to say that, sweet, yeah; I have tasted that gum like *Big Red or something tastes like, what do I want to say? I can't get the word. Jesus it's that gum smell like something like Big Red. Can I say that? Ok. Big Red. Big Red gum." But Jahai speakers named smells with relative ease. They used abstract terms and were much more likely to converge in their responses. In a follow-up study, wine and coffee experts performed just as badly as novices when given non-wine and non-coffee smells, suggesting the Jahai's enhanced abilities aren't simply a result of practice in attending to aromas. Rather, the regular exercise of sorting the olfactory world with abstract labels seems to change how the Jahai understand all smells, familiar and otherwise.

The work on olfaction is a tiny part of a large research program, much of it headed by Majid, that has overturned the scientific consensus on how humans talk about the senses. At least since Aristotle, many writers have posited a sensorial hierarchy: seeing and hearing are said to be the most salient to our minds and the easiest to verbalize, followed by taste, touch, and finally smell. Contesting that thesis, Majid and her colleagues have developed a measure called codability, which captures how easily a sense is expressed. Codability is high when members of a language community converge on one or two abstract labels to describe a stimulus; ask English speakers to tell you the color of a stop sign, and you'd expect high codability. It's low, in contrast, when people provide diverse, protracted, and ad-hoc descriptions—as when, say, you ask English speakers to describe the smell of a rutabaga.

Majid and her team measured codability for the five senses in twenty far-flung languages, including three unrelated sign languages. English, the only spoken Western European tongue in the sample, was also the only one to exhibit high codability for sight and hearing and low codability for everything else. "Rampant variation" reigned, the researchers found. English

speakers floundered when talking about touch (in response to sandpaper, felt, rubber, etc.), but speakers of certain other languages—such as Dogul Dom, in Mali, and Siwu, in Ghana—tended to agree in their descriptions. In many languages, including Lao, Farsi, Yucatec, and Cantonese, taste turned out to be the most expressible sense.

As researchers look beyond English, close relatives (like Spanish and German), and other so-called behemoth languages (like Mandarin and Arabic), they encounter differences long thought impossible. Twenty years ago, abstract smell vocabularies seemed ridiculous. Burenhult studied the Jahai language for a decade, even writing a doctoral dissertation on its grammar, before Majid asked him to run a battery of tasks that revealed Jahai speakers' exceptional way of talking about smell. (5)<u>Other linguistic features once assumed to be universal—such as tenses, personal pronouns, and even, potentially, a distinction between nouns and verbs—have turned up missing when greater numbers of languages have been scrutinized.</u> Likewise, we've enlarged our sense of the metaphors used to map concepts. English describes acoustic pitch using a verticality metaphor (high-low), but a study by experts in musical cognition found that people around the world use at least thirty-five other mappings, such as small-big, alert-sleepy, pretty-ugly, tense-relaxed, summer-winter, and—in the case of some traditional Zimbabwean instrumentalists—"crocodile" (low pitch) and "those who follow crocodiles" (high pitch).

Everett's book revels in such discoveries, which ⌈ （ 6 ） ⌉ the conceivable differences separating languages. In a recent review of the research literature, the language scientist Damián E. Blasi, along with Majid and others, listed the many cognitive domains that English seems to affect, including memory, theory of mind, spatial reasoning, event processing, aesthetic preferences, and sensitivity to rhythm and melody. Languages help shape the worlds we inhabit less through a few grammatical rules than through countless (7)<u>subtle distinctions</u>. John McWhorter might have been right that the effect of any single linguistic feature is minor. But, as Isaac Newton realized when developing calculus, innumerable tiny effects create large-scale patterns.

＊eensy-weensy:「とても小さい」という意味の口語表現。

＊*Aquillaria* wood: 日本語で「沈香」と呼ばれる, 良い香りがする高価な木。

＊bearcat: 東南アジアなどに生息するジャコウネコ科の動物。

＊Big Red: アメリカなどで有名な, シナモン味のチューインガムの商品。